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This paper asks to what extent changes in the profiles of politicians reflect changes in 
party ideology over time. Do individual politicians drive party policy or the other way 
around? These are critical questions for understanding political representation and 
political party transformation over time. To answer these questions I have collected data 
that map changes in the professional, educational and political backgrounds of cabinet 
ministers over time. This new dataset has unique biographical information of cabinet 
ministers in 18 parliamentary democracies from 1945 to 2012. Specifically, I have 
collected and coded information on the educational and professional background of 
cabinet ministers, their partisan affiliation and seniority in their political party, their 
political professional experience in the parliament and parliamentary committees as well 
as their experience in government cabinets. Preliminary results show that over time, 
ministerial professionalization has increased, measured in terms of years in the 
parliament as well as years in the legal profession. In addition, more economics ministers 
have corporate background and fewer have working-class background. These changes 
strongly correlate with a right-ward shift in political party ideology, as measured by 
political parties’ electoral manifestos.  
                                                
1 Paper prepared for the Annual American Political Science Association Conference, 
Washington DC, August 2014 
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Introduction 
 
Who governs us? The Oscar winning documentary ‘Inside Job’ blamed revolving door 
politics for the 2008 financial crisis. According to the documentary, the de-regulation of 
the financial industry was the outcome of senior political appointments directly from 
Wall Street. During the last twenty years a number of US Treasury secretaries were 
leading Wall-Street figures, such as the former Goldman Sachs bankers, Henry Paulson 
and Robert Rubin. It is no wonder then that the US government is often perceived as “a 
Wall Street government”.2    
 
At the same time some argue that the professionalization of politics, understood as an 
increase in the number of politicians whose professional career has been solely political 
either in the form of political appointments or in the form of back-office work, such as 
being an advisor to a political party or a politician, threatens representation (Allen 
2013a). A recent report from the House of Commons, the British lower parliament, shows 
that the number of professional politicians has risen from 3% in 1979 to 15% in 2010 
(McGuinness 2010). However, this number is even higher once we look at the 
background of cabinet ministers (Allen 2013b).  
  
The goal of this paper is not to test the revolving door hypothesis or to address questions 
of representation in parliamentary democracies. This paper is exploratory. It asks how 
does the political and professional background of top cabinet ministers, and primarily of 
ministers who shape economic policy change over time? Secondly, the paper seeks to 
provide some preliminary evidence regarding the causes that drive these changes. Do 
ministers’ profiles change over time due to globalization and the dominance of capitalism 
or does evolving party ideology affect ministerial appointments?  
 
                                                
2 This is a famous in ‘Inside Job’ quote by Robert Gnaizda, activist, founder of Greenlining 
Institute and former California’s Health Director.  
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Utilizing a new dataset on the professional and political background of cabinet ministers 
in 18 parliamentary democracies I am able to investigate whether parliamentary cabinets 
are stable in their ministers’ profile over time, or whether they are becoming more 
professionalized and more “Wall Street cabinets”. In addition, I explore the possibility 
that changing party ideology and globalization drive ministerial appointments. 
 
The paper is developed in the following way. First I present the data and then I provide 
summary statistics regarding cabinet ministers’ professional background and political 
experience. Then, using simple graphs, I explore the effect of time, globalization and 
party ideology on ministerial appointments.  The last part of the paper concludes.   
 
The data 
 
I have compiled a new and unique dataset on the appointments and personal background 
of select cabinet ministers in 18 parliamentary democracies, starting as early as 1945.3 To 
my knowledge, this is the first cross-country dataset that spans over half a century, and 
which provides detailed background information on a select number of ministerial 
portfolios. Scholars who have been studying questions of government formation have 
utilized the rich datasets on party portfolio control compiled by Woldendorp, Keman and 
Budge (2000) or by Muller and Strom (2000). However, these datasets do not identify 
individual ministers; in addition, they do not code changes in the control of portfolios by 
political parties, and certainly not by cabinet ministers during the life of a cabinet. On the 
other hand, scholars who study political careers have compiled detailed biographical data 
on cabinet ministers but these tend to be confined to a single country. Escobar-Lemmon 
and Taylor-Robinson (2013) are the only researchers that have put together a cross-
country and detailed dataset on ministers’ background in a select number of Latin 
American countries. The Global Leadership Project4 is the most comprehensive dataset 
                                                
3 Table 1 of the Appendix presents the country/years included in the dataset. 
4 http://www.globalleadershipproject.org/ 
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with individual level data on decision-makers, including governments, parliaments and 
the judiciary in 162 countries. However, this dataset is cross sectional so far.   
 
My dataset consists of ministerial appointments to the portfolios of the prime minister, 
the deputy prime minister, as well as the ministers of foreign affairs, economics, finance, 
budget- when applicable- health, employment and social affairs. The central aim of the 
dataset is to identify the individual minister who is responsible for the policies of foreign 
affairs, economics, finance, health, employment and social affairs. This information has 
been collected by relying firstly, on formal governmental websites, secondly on the 
international Who’s Who, and thirdly on Wikipedia. The information has been checked 
across data sources by at least two different coders.  
 
The unit of analysis in the original dataset is individual ministers nested in cabinets, 
which in turn are nested in governments of 18 parliamentary countries. In other words, 
the dataset is structured at four different levels; individual ministers, cabinets, 
governments and countries. An original feature of this dataset is that it traces ministerial 
changes within the life of a government. This includes both individual ministerial 
reshuffles and cabinet wide-reshuffles, but only with respect to the 8 portfolios under 
study. Thus, in countries where ministerial and cabinet reshuffles are very common, the 
number of ministerial appointments can be substantially higher than in countries where 
ministers have longer tenures in a portfolio. For example, the dataset codes 39 ministerial 
appointments in the portfolio of social affairs in Greece in the last 38 years, when the 
number for similar ministerial appointments in the Netherlands is only 13. Furthermore, 
the number of appointments is often different from the actual number of ministers since a 
new appointment is coded every time there is a reshuffle in one of the 8 portfolios under 
study. Thus, regarding the Greek social affairs ministers, 31 individual ministers of social 
affair were appointed during the last 38 years, while the number of appointments due to 
governmental and ministerial changes in the dataset is 39.  
 
The dataset identifies one minister per cabinet who is responsible for a portfolio. While 
this assumption is rather strict given that in many cases more than one ministers co-
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decide on a policy, it is also a reasonable assumption to the extent that one minister is 
ultimately responsible for drafting a bill and only one minister is accountable to the 
cabinet, the parliament and voters over his or her bill.   
 
The data includes detailed background biographical information for the ministers who 
control the 8 portfolios in the study. The following information has been collected: name, 
year of birth, place of birth, gender, party, party family (and all relevant information 
regarding their political party), education level and education field, profession prior to 
entering politics, the year of joining the political party, the year of election to the 
parliament, the year of first cabinet appointment, parliamentary committees the minister 
served that directly correspond to the ministerial appointment, whether he or she served 
as a junior minister to the portfolio of interest, whether the minister has a low or high 
party position, how many years he or she has been in the portfolio, and the number of 
years he or she has been a cabinet minister.   
 
Professional background of cabinet ministers: exploring the professionalization of 
politics hypothesis  
 
The descriptive statistics I present in this paper are based on the eight cabinet portfolios I 
have coded. At the same time, I pay particular attention to three key ministerial positions 
for economic outcomes, that of the prime minister, the finance minister and the minister 
of employment. While it is self-evident that prime ministers and ministers of finance are 
central in economic policy outcomes, the minister of employment is less obvious. Overall 
the department of employment is of lower visibility and political saliency than the 
department of foreign or internal affairs (Druckman and Warwick 2005). At the same 
time, ministers of employment deal with the two most important interest groups in 
economic policy-making: employers and trade unions. Ministers of employment are both 
government representatives towards these important interest groups, but they are also 
important brokers between the government and employers and trade unions.  In addition, 
they participate in all inner-cabinet meetings regarding economic policy and thus can 
have a disproportionate impact on policy even if they are not as high profile as finance 
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ministers. In fact, to the extent that employment ministers are directly responsible for 
policies that affect employment growth, they are critical actors in macro-economic 
planning and management. Thus, students of economic policy should be particularly 
interested in who the ministers of employment are.  
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the professional background of cabinet ministers in the 
18 parliamentary democracies. The numbers reported in Table 1 are the sum of all the 
appointments for the cabinet ministers under study. To remind the reader, these sums are 
not the total number of ministers but of ministerial appointments, including ministerial 
reshuffles. What is important here is not the absolute number of ministerial appointments 
but the relative frequency of ministerial appointments of lawyers against civil servants, 
for example. The professional backgrounds with the highest frequency are highlighted.  
 
Table 1 reveals that the majority of cabinet ministers is drawn from the ranks of lawyers, 
teachers and university professors, the bureaucracy, local politics and trade unions, in the 
case of employment ministers. On average most cabinet ministers (out of the eight 
portfolios included in the study) have exercised the legal profession. This is hardly 
surprising as lawyers are knowledgeable in constitutional affairs and are generally gifted 
orators, a skill that is critical for elected politicians. Ministers of employment are an 
exception in that the most common professional background for them is being a trade 
union official. This finding is also not surprising to the extent that cabinet ministers are 
critical brokers between the government and the industry they need to regulate or policy 
community their policies primarily affect. Perhaps a more surprising finding is that 
university professors and school teachers is, on average, a more common background 
profession than senior civil servants. Finally, local politics is another common source of 
ministerial recruitment.  
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Table 1: The professional background of cabinet ministers in 18 parliamentary democracies 
Primary Prior Profession All ministers Prime 
minister 
Finance 
minister 
Employment 
minister  
     
Economist 186 63 43 10 
Finance/Banking 134 29 60 7 
Executive 169 19 38 33 
Businessman 107 27 17 17 
Self Employed 119 25 11 23 
Employee 107 12 9 26 
Consultant 29 2 8 6 
Lawyer 905 188 184 141 
Policy advisor 191 42 18 17 
Medical doctor 143 8 3 7 
Engineer 55 6 8 13 
Scientists 31 17 1 2 
Humanities 48 0 1 5 
Professors & Teachers 758 115 171 108 
Journalists 173 27 19 18 
Military 68 9 2 6 
Civil Servant 545 67 81 82 
Blue Collar 98 22 21 33 
Living off politics 247 55 25 28 
Full Time Trade Union 333 33 46 145 
Full Time Employers' Org. 23 6 2 8 
Full Time Interest group 30 2 6 7 
Local Politics 366 69 56 87 
European Parliament 31 0 4 4 
Supranational Institution 47 7 7 1 
Non-for Profit/ Charity 17 6 4 0 
Other 56 6 9 5 
Unknown 57 1 1 16 
 
One might reasonably suspect that there is large cross-country variation in the dominant 
professional backgrounds of cabinet ministers for a number of historic, political and 
bureaucratic reasons. For example, there is a large literature on strong connection 
between the French state and its bureaucracy. Similarly, the links between political 
parties, governments and interest groups varies significantly by country with corporatist 
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economies having stronger links with trade unions than liberal economies (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). 
 
To further investigate significant cross-country variations in the professional background 
of cabinet ministers, I group some of the major professions. Specifically, I created a new 
group with the name ‘Professional Politicians’ which sums three categories: local 
politics, living off politics and European Parliament. The second new category I include 
is Econ/Banking/Business, which includes the top four categories from Table 1, namely, 
Economists, Finance/Banking, Executives and Businessmen. As in Table 1, Table 2 
reports only the percentages of the primary professional careers of cabinet ministers. 
Therefore, if a minister had two professional careers, such as a career in the legal 
profession and in local politics, I include only the career that he or she exercised for the 
longest period. In the appendix I provide tables, which count the secondary professions of 
cabinet ministers.  
 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the main professions by country. The results are striking 
in that, firstly, legal and political backgrounds dominate across the board, while at the 
same time there is considerable variation across countries. In Australia, Canada, Greece 
and Ireland the predominant profession for cabinet ministers is legal, while for Finland, 
France, Germany and Sweden the most common professional background is local, 
national and supranational politics. Also, Italy and Portugal stand out for the large 
number of cabinet ministers who have a background in education, while Austria and 
Denmark stand out for the large number of ministers with background in the trade union 
movement. Yet, in other countries one cannot single out any one category: in Belgium 
both legal and political backgrounds dominate over others, in Italy and New Zealand 
most ministers have a legal and educational background while in the UK an equal 
percentage of ministers have a legal and trade union background.  
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Table 2: Cabinet Ministers' Prior Professional Background by Country 
Country Legal 
Profession 
Professional 
Politicians  
Econ/Banking 
/Business 
Professors/ 
Teachers 
Union 
Officials 
Bureaucrats 
       
Australia 0.33 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.14 
Austria 0.03 0.18 0.21 0.04 0.40 0.01 
Belgium 0.21 0.20 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.10 
Canada 0.41 0.08 0.29 0.08 0.02 0.05 
Denmark 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.21 0.07 
Finland 0.04 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.13 
France 0.07 0.37 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.27 
Germany 0.19 0.34 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.08 
Greece 0.29 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.05 
Ireland 0.21 0.10 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.04 
Italy 0.29 0.01 0.13 0.33 0.02 0.01 
Netherlands 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.25 
New Zealand 0.17 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.00 0.04 
Norway 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.01 0.16 
Portugal 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.56 0.01 0.11 
Spain 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.42 
Sweden 0.09 0.25 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.14 
United Kingdom 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.05 
       
Total 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.11 
 
To sum up, Tables 1 and 2 inform us that politicians with legal and political professional 
background are generally more likely to make it to the highest office but that there is also 
considerable country variation. For example, many more cabinet ministers in Norway and 
Portugal have a background in education and the civil service than in politics. However, 
could it be the case that some professional backgrounds are on the rise and others are 
declining? Tables 1 and 2 do not allows us to investigate this question as they average 
professional backgrounds from 1945 to 2012. To do that one must look at how 
politicians’ professional backgrounds evolve over time.  
 
Figure 1 reveals that there is a strong basis for the hypothesis of the professionalization of 
politics. Having no other professional experience than directly a political one, is the only 
career path out of the main career paths that has been steadily on the rise. Specifically, on 
average, the legal background has been the predominant one over time. About 18% of all 
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cabinet ministers included in this study have had legal background. This was true in 1945 
and is still true today. Similarly, a relatively large percentage of cabinet ministers have 
had a background in education of about 15%. In contrast, the percentage of ministers with 
background in top civil service job has been steadily declining from about 12 per cent to 
under 10 per cent. However, by far the most interesting finding is that the percentage of 
cabinet ministers who start their political carer either at the national level at a very young 
age or at the local level has steadily increased from about 6 per cent to over 20 per cent. 
This is a particularly strong result given the stability of other professional backgrounds 
over time. To sum up, the exploratory graphs on Figure1 provide strong evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis that politics is becoming more professionalized over time with 
legal and political backgrounds dominating other professional backgrounds, and even 
more importantly with political professional backgrounds increasing steadily over time.     
 
Figure 1: The Professionalization of Politics. Ministers' Professional Background Over Time 
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An alternative way to test whether politics has become more professionalized is to see 
whether longer parliamentary experience is required for top ministerial posts in recent 
times than in the past. If politics today is a full time vocation more than it has been, we 
would expect politicians with longer parliamentary experience to be more likely to be 
rewarded ministerial posts. If the opposite is true, if over time the number of people who 
live ‘for’ politics and those who live ‘off’ politics (Weber 1965) is stable, then we should 
find that ministers’ parliamentary experience has not increased over time. Figure 2 shows 
the number of years it takes on average for a member of parliament before he is 
appointed to a top ministerial job. On average, members of parliament spent between16 
and 17 years on the parliamentary benches before they became prime ministers. For 
finance ministers the waiting time was lower, between 11 and 13 years. However, after 
the mid eighties, the years of parliamentary experience for both prime ministers and 
finance ministers have been steadily rising. In the two-thousands, on average, prime 
ministers have had twenty years of parliamentary experience, while finance ministers 
have had 15 years of experience.   
 
Figure 2: Years in parliament prior to ministerial posts 
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Professional background of cabinet ministers: exploring the Wall Street 
Government hypothesis  
 
In the preceding section I showed that politicians’ professional backgrounds evolve over 
time and that many more politicians, who enter office, have not had a job outside politics 
in recent years than in the past. Moreover, I showed that more years of parliamentary 
experience are required before politicians attain the highest office posts in the cabinet. In 
this section I explore the hypothesis that over time an increasing number of finance and 
employment ministers have a background in finance and banking. Indeed according to 
Figures 3 and 4 having a background in economics, banking or business has been steadily 
on the rise for both ministers of finance and of employment. Specifically, while for 
finance ministers having a financial and business background have always been common, 
the percentage of finance ministers with such background has increased from about 15% 
to 25%. The rise for ministers of employment has been much more dramatic, with a rise 
from about 5% to close to 20%.  
 
Figure 3: Professional Background o Finance Ministers Over Time 
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Figure 4: Professional Background of Employment Ministers 
 
A second interesting piece of information reveals by Figure 4 is that employment 
ministers with political professional background have also been on the rise. On the other 
hand, employment ministers with background in the trade union movement have been 
steadily declining. Overall, while in 1960 30% of all employment ministers had a 
background in trade unions, 5% had a background in finance and business, and another 
10% were professional politicians, the percentages are reversed in the two thousands with 
about 15% having a background in trade unions, close to 20% having a background in 
finance and business and almost 25% being professional politicians.  
 
In other words, Figures 3 and 4 provide support to the hypothesis of the 
professionalization of politics as well as to the Wall Street government hypothesis. An 
increasing number of cabinet ministers, who make crucial economic and employment 
decisions, come from the industry or have a purely political background. One might ask 
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to what extent are these results driven by outliers? To answer this question I provide the 
summary tables for the major professional backgrounds of finance and employment 
ministers in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. Tables 3 and 4 reveal two new pieces of 
information. The first piece of information is that, unsurprisingly, in a large number of 
countries (Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand) more than 20% 
of finance ministers have a background in economics, finance and business, and more 
than 10% in all other countries, with the exception of Greece and Germany. Thus, this 
preliminary data exploration indicates that upward average trend for finance ministers 
being directly recruited from the finance and business industry should apply to a large 
number of western parliamentary democracies. 
     
Table 3: Primary Professional Background of Finance ministers by Country 
Country Legal 
Profession 
Professional 
Politicians  
Econ/Banking 
/Business 
Professors/ 
Teachers 
Union 
Officials 
Bureaucrats 
       
Australia 0.46 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.11 
Austria 0.00 0.31 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Belgium 0.42 0.18 0.09 0.18 0.00 0.03 
Canada 0.56 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Denmark 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.20 0.33 0.00 
Finland 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.02 0.22 
France 0.14 0.29 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.22 
Germany 0.16 0.67 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.05 
Greece 0.23 0.04 0.06 0.40 0.00 0.00 
Ireland 0.35 0.11 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Italy 0.27 0.00 0.20 0.44 0.01 0.02 
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.32 0.06 0.21 
New Zealand 0.20 0.04 0.36 0.16 0.00 0.04 
Norway 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.00 0.27 
Portugal 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.66 0.00 0.10 
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.56 0.00 0.32 
Sweden 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.27 0.24 0.15 
United Kingdom 0.22 0.00 0.14 0.28 0.08 0.02 
       
Total 0.22 0.10 0.18 0.20 0.05 0.09 
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Table 4: Primary Professional background of Employment Ministers by Country 
Country Legal 
Profession 
Professional 
Politicians  
Econ/Banking 
/Business 
Professors/ 
Teachers 
Union 
Officials 
Bureaucrats 
       
Australia 0.38 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.24 0.17 
Austria 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.86 0.00 
Belgium 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.03 
Canada 0.19 0.14 0.36 0.08 0.10 0.05 
Denmark 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.30 0.32 0.08 
Finland 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.10 
France 0.00 0.63 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.31 
Germany 0.02 0.41 0.00 0.10 0.39 0.07 
Greece 0.67 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.00 
Ireland 0.07 0.27 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.00 
Italy 0.33 0.00 0.03 0.33 0.13 0.00 
Netherlands 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.29 0.26 
New Zealand 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.11 
Norway 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.16 
Portugal 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.41 0.03 0.13 
Spain 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.44 0.00 0.26 
Sweden 0.14 0.39 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 
United Kingdom 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.22 0.00 
       
Total 0.16 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.09 
 
The second interesting piece of information revealed by Table 4 is that only in Canada 
and Ireland we find a considerable number of employment ministers with finance and 
business background. The professional background of employment ministers is more 
variable across countries than the professional background of finance ministers. 
Therefore, further exploration is necessary before we can draw conclusions regarding the 
impressive rise in the numbers of employment ministers with economics, finance and 
business backgrounds.  
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A preliminary investigation on the causes of the evolving background of cabinet 
ministers  
 
What drives the changes in cabinet ministers’ professional backgrounds? Here I am not 
able to provide an answer to this question, as this would require a fleshed out theory of 
ministerial appointments followed by data analysis. Instead, I present a preliminary 
investigation on potential factors that might drive the changes in cabinet ministers’ 
professional backgrounds. The obvious suspects are economic globalization and shifts in 
party ideology.  
 
There is a substantial literature on the effects of economic globalization on political 
parties’ organization and ideological profile. According to Katz and Mair (1995) and 
Blyth and Katz (2005) dramatic changes in the socio-economic profiles of electorates 
together with the maturation of the welfare state and economic globalization have 
challenged the identity of traditional parties, which have responded by coalescing with 
each other, i.e. by not competing with each other on ideological terms. As a result, there 
is little ideological difference between the mainstream political parties making the left-
right ideological divide less prevalent, if meaningful at all. This thesis goes against the 
traditional understanding of the role of political parties as coalitions of citizens with 
divergent interests, best captured by mass parties (Katz and Mair 1995). Instead, current 
political parties have little connection with their voter base and operate, literally, 
independently of their core constituencies (Blyth and Katz 2005).  
 
If the Cartel Party hypothesis is correct, we might be able to attribute the shift in 
politicians’ professional background to the forces of globalization and the subsequent 
ideological convergence among competing political parties. Perhaps parliamentary 
cabinets are becoming more professionalized because parties are themselves less 
ideological and they have less connection with the party base. For example, Marshall and 
Fisher (2014) find that economic globalization has decreased electoral turnout. At the 
same time, it is possible that this ideological convergence is not uniform across party 
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families. Adams, Haupt and Stoll (2009) find that social democratic parties have 
maintained more ideological positions than centre-right parties. Similarly, Haupt (2010) 
finds that economic openness doezs not have the expected right-ward effect on political 
parties.  
 
In Figure 5 I split the sample of political parties into party families of the center-right 
(Conservative, Christian democrats and Liberals) and of the left (Communists, New Left 
and Social-democrats) and I plot the percentage of ministers, who had no professional 
experience outside politics, over time. The results indeed indicate that the 
professionalization of politics appears to be primarily taking place among centre-right 
parties and less so among left parties. The percentage of cabinet ministers with only 
political professional experience has increased from 10 to 30% in right parties, and from 
10 to under 15% for left parties. By 2000, 30% of centre-right ministers and 15% of 
centre-left ministers had no professional experience outside politics.  
 
In Figure 6 I look at whether the findings of Figure 5 are due to coding error by plotting 
the percentage of ministers with any, primary or secondary, political professional 
experience prior to their full time political engagement as MPs or cabinet ministers. 
Despite the expected increase in the actual percentages of ministers with professional 
political experience, the differences between left and right parties are of comparable 
magnitude. More than 50% of all centre-right cabinet ministers had professional political 
experience, while the number drops to 35% for social-democrat ministers. Although I do 
not explore how changes in party ideology affect ministers’ professional background, 
Figures 5 and 6 show that there politicians’ professional backgrounds vary by party 
family, and that in fact these differences have been becoming more prominent over time. 
Overall, to the extent that ministers’ professional backgrounds capture the process of 
professionalization of politics, parties of the right have been more affected than parties of 
the left.  
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Figure 5: Left and right cabinet ministers and their political professional background 
 
 
Figure 6: Left and right cabinet ministers and their political professional background 
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Finally, I briefly explore the hypothesis that economic globalization and shifts in political 
parties’ policy positions induce party leaders to appoint more finance ministers with 
finance and business background. To do that, I use the an indicator on the left-right 
policy positioning of political parties as coded by the Comparative Manifesto Data 
Project (Klingemann et al. 2006), as well as an index of economic globalization, which 
includes both trade and capital account measures of economic openness (Dreher, Gaston 
and Martens 2008). By looking at these two indicators simultaneously I try to infer if 
parties’ policy positions, as expressed in their electoral manifestos have more or less 
impact on ministerial selection than economic necessity due to rising economic openness. 
Of course, ultimately a multivariate statistical analysis is required to answer this question. 
Here I am only interested in an initial exploration of this hypothesis.  
 
Figure 7: Party Ideology, Economic Globalization and Finance ministers with Finance and Business 
Background 
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Figure 7 shows that both party ideology and economic globalization positively correlate 
with a larger number of finance ministers with a background in economics, banking and 
business.  The left-right measure (rile) ranges from -50 (left) to +50 (right)- values higher 
than +50 are outliers. Thus, if we ignore the values of ‘rile’ that exceed 50, the two 
indicators of globalization and left-right ideology have comparable effects on selection of 
finance ministers. Parties with more right-wing ideology are twice as likely to appoint a 
finance minister with background in finance and business than parties with more left-
wing ideology. Similarly, as economic globalization increases from 40 to 80, the number 
of finance ministers with finance and business background doubles from about 12% to 
22%. 
 
Discussion 
   
With the aid of a new dataset on ministers’ professional background, this paper attempts 
an initial exploration of the hypothesis that politics is becoming more professionalized 
and more dominated by finance and business personalities. The dataset, which includes 
the professional and political background of cabinet ministers, includes 8 major cabinet 
portfolios (prime minister, deputy prime minister, foreign affairs, finance, economics, 
employment, health and social affairs) and covers 18 parliamentary democracies from 
1945 to 2012.  
 
The preliminary findings, based on summary statistics and simple bivariate relationships, 
provide initial support for the hypothesis that politics is becoming more professionalized 
and that, over time, more ministers of finance and of employment have background in 
economics, banking and business. Specifically, despite important cross-national 
differences, an increasing number of cabinet ministers have had no other professional 
experience than politics. This number has been steadily increasing and is as high as 20%. 
When we disaggregate political parties into left and right we find that the increase in 
professional politicians has been twice as high in center-right parties than in parties of the 
left.  
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The preliminary results for the hypothesis that finance and business have an increasing 
influence on governments due to a higher number of economics ministers who come 
from these industries are also supportive. Finance ministers whose primary professional 
background is in economics, finance and business constitute 25% of all finance ministers, 
compared to 15% in 1960. More right-wing party ideology and higher levels of economic 
globalization both positively correlate with a higher number of finance ministers with 
economics, banking and business background.  
 
The goal of this paper is to present the new dataset on ministers’ political and 
professional background and to explore potential avenues of research addressing 
important questions on the evolving nature of politics and of representation in 
parliamentary democracies. More research is required before we can reach any 
conclusions on these important questions.      
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Appendix 
 
Table 5: Countries and years included in the dataset 
Country Years 
Australia 1945-2012 
Austria 1945-2011 
Belgium 1972-2011 
Canada 1945-2011 
Denmark 1945-2010 
Finland 1945-2011 
France 1959-2012 
Germany 1949-2011 
Greece 1974-2012 
Ireland 1948-2011 
Italy 1945-2011 
Netherlands 1946-2010 
New Zealand 1946-2011 
Norway 1945-2012 
Portugal 1976-2011 
Spain 1976-2011 
Sweden 1946-2010 
United Kingdom 1945-2012 
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Table 6: Professional Background by Country (including both primary and secondary professions) 
Country Legal 
Profession 
Professional 
Politicians  
Econ/Banking 
/Business 
Professors/ 
Teachers 
Union 
Officials 
Bureaucrats 
       
Australia 0.36 0.27 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.21 
Austria 0.06 0.34 0.30 0.05 0.43 0.12 
Belgium 0.31 0.55 0.08 0.21 0.05 0.20 
Canada 0.52 0.22 0.37 0.31 0.02 0.11 
Denmark 0.04 0.27 0.14 0.24 0.30 0.19 
Finland 0.07 0.26 0.23 0.16 0.06 0.22 
France 0.15 0.62 0.29 0.11 0.02 0.44 
Germany 0.30 0.46 0.22 0.14 0.08 0.11 
Greece 0.34 0.23 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.09 
Ireland 0.25 0.54 0.22 0.19 0.04 0.17 
Italy 0.29 0.01 0.14 0.33 0.04 0.01 
Netherlands 0.09 0.28 0.20 0.32 0.11 0.39 
New Zealand 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.22 0.03 0.07 
Norway 0.10 0.22 0.13 0.19 0.03 0.27 
Portugal 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.56 0.01 0.11 
Spain 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.42 
Sweden 0.16 0.42 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.33 
United Kingdom 0.17 0.35 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.16 
       
Total 0.22 0.29 0.19 0.22 0.09 0.19 
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Table 7: Parliamentary and Cabinet experience of cabinet ministers prior to appointments 
Country	   Years	  in	  
Lower	  
Parliament	  
Years	  in	  
cabinet	  
Portfolios	  
held	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Australia	   16.75	   7.68	   2.25	  
Austria	   1.50	   3.77	   1.08	  
Belgium	   12.13	   7.82	   2.91	  
Canada	   10.71	   5.49	   2.76	  
Denmark	   10.13	   5.43	   1.52	  
Finland	   12.24	   3.84	   1.25	  
France	   10.51	   4.21	   2.00	  
Germany	   10.50	   6.56	   0.98	  
Greece	   6.74	   3.38	   1.31	  
Ireland	   17.65	   8.41	   2.38	  
Italy	   10.44	   5.86	   1.60	  
Netherlands	   4.55	   4.18	   0.97	  
New	  Zealand	   16.64	   9.41	   3.80	  
Norway	   14.98	   3.20	   0.82	  
Portugal	   7.11	   1.66	   0.55	  
Spain	   8.42	   4.84	   1.12	  
Sweden	   14.62	   10.41	   1.76	  
United	  Kingdom	   17.97	   5.92	   2.17	  
	   	  	   	   	  	  
Total	   12.31	   5.76	   1.81	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